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RECENT DECISIONS
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE-ACT

OF STATE DOCTRINE
PRECLUDES JUDICIAL INQUIRY INTO THE MOTIVATION UNDERLYING THE
AcTs OF A FOREIGN STATE IN A PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUIT

I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Nelson Bunker Hunt, an independent oil producer operating in
Libya, brought suit' against seven major oil companies operating
Libyan and Persian Gulf oil fields2 for three antitrust violations3
and breach of contract.' The seven major producers had initiated
an agreement5 whereby each agreed to share proportionally any
loss caused by the production cutback of any other producer who
was a party to the agreement. Plaintiff joined in the agreement
1. Nelson Bunker Hunt filed the complaint on March 3, 1975. On January 9,
1976, the complaint was amended to include W. Herbert Hunt and Lamar Hunt.
The plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as "Hunt," had obtained an oil concession
in Libya's Sarir Field in 1957. Between 1961 and 1971, production in the Sarir
Field was shared equally by Hunt and British Petroleum Company.
2. Defendants, Mobile Oil Corp., Texaco, Inc., Standard Oil Co. of California,
British Petroleum Co., Exxon Corp., Gulf Oil Corp., Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
and Grace Petroleum Corp., derived approximately 90% of their oil production
from the Persian Gulf fields.
3. Two statutes were allegedly violated. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975) states in relevant part: "Every ... combination...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce .

. .,

is declared to be illegal."

Section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970) states in relevant part:
"Every . . . agreement . . . is . . . illegal . . . when the same is made by or
between two or more persons or corporations . . . engaged in importing any

article from any foreign country into the United States, and when such combination

. . .

is intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade or commerce."

4. The defendants moved to dismiss the contract claims, the grounds for
which are not relevant to this appeal.
5. The Libyan Producers Agreement of January 15, 1971 was designed to
reduce the effect of an increasingly belligerent Libyan policy towards American
oil interests. The agreement provided that if "there was insufficient Libyan oil
to meet contractual obligations to existing European or Western Hemisphere
customers due to restrictions or a government shutdown, the Persian Gulf producers would supply the Libyan producers with Persian Gulf oil at cost . .. .
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1977).
6. Anticipating the antitrust implications, defendants had obtained a letter
from the Department of Justice indicating the Department would not bring an
antitrust action if independent Libyan producers were included in any proposed
joint action. Upon invitation of the defendants, Hunt participated in the meetings
that eventually gave rise to the agreement.
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and in reliance thereon subsequently refused a demand to market
expropriated oil for Libya. 7 In the third of the antitrust claims,'
plaintiff contended that the defendants combined and conspired
to establish a competitive advantage of Persian Gulf oil over Libyan oil through the agreement which precluded plaintiff from
negotiating with Libya to the defendants' disadvantage. Plaintiff
further alleged that defendants' manipulations of plaintiffs dealings with Libya led to the nationalization of plaintiff's Libyan oil
assets. Defendants moved to dismiss the three antitrust claims for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state claims
upon which relief could be granted. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York denied defendants'
motion to dismiss the first two antitrust claims but granted the
motion with respect to the third. On appeal of the third claim to
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. The
act of state doctrine precludes judicial inquiry into the actions and
the motivation underlying the acts of a foreign state in a private
antitrust action. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 46 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Dec.
6, 1977) (No. 76-1403).
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The act of state doctrine, which renders a claim non-justiciable,'
7. On October 7, 1971, Libya nationalized British Petroleum's interests and
demanded that Hunt market the oil for Libya. Hunt refused, and in early 1972
Libya evicted Hunt personnel and cut back Hunt's permitted oil production by
fifty percent. Hunt's right to produce and export Libyan crude oil was terminated
on May 24, 1973. Nationalization of Hunt's assets followed on June 11, 1973,
pursuant to Libya's Law 42 of June 11, 1973.
8. The third claim states in relevant part:
[Tihe seven majors . . . have engaged in a combination and/or conspiracy
in unreasonable restraint of . . . foreign trade . . [and] have combined
and conspired among themselves to preserve the competitive advantage of
Persian Gulf crude oil relative to that of Libyan crude oil, and to diminish
competition from Libyan crude oil. . . . In furtherance of this unlawful
combination and conspiracy, the seven majors entered into written agreements with Hunt and other Libyan producers, manipulated the course of
Libyan negotiations so as to advance their own interests in the Persian Gulf,
and followed a course of action that led to Hunt's nationalization and
elimination from the production of Libyan crude oil.
550 F.2d at 72.
9. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
773-74 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). One writer has compared justiciability in
act of state cases with the political question doctrine. See Lowenfeld, Act of State
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is a principle of federal common law."0 The doctrine was formally
articulated in Underhill v. Hernandez" wherein the Court stated,
"Every sovereign is bound to respect the independence of every
other State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.""2 Since Underhill two competing theories concerning the
doctrine's purpose have evolved, and although they are not mutually exclusive, the conflict between them has made consistent
application of the doctrine difficult. One theory maintains that the
13
doctrine's underlying concern is to preserve international comity.
The second theory bases the doctrine on sustaining the separation
of powers.14 Whichever theory is adopted, it is clear that the doctrine as applied by American courts is not mandated as a rule of
international law.15 American courts have sought to apply the act
of state barrier to various situations including: claims of private
party responsibility for activity committed in conjunction with a
foreign state;' 8 actions demanding either restitution from private
parties 7 or restoration of property confiscated by a foreign government; 8 and suits applying antitrust laws to alleged monopolizaand Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
66 AM. J.

10.

INT'L

L. 795, 811 (1972).

Williams, The Act of State Doctrine: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.

Republic of Cuba, 9 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 735, 736 (1976).
11. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
12. For an earlier pronouncement of the doctrine by a state court, see Hatch
v. Baez, 7 Hun 596 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1876).
13. In Oetjen v. CentralLeather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918), the Supreme
Court held that the act of state doctrine prevented American courts from reexamining a seizure by Mexican military authorities of hides owned by a Mexican
citizen, stating that the doctrine "rests at last upon the highest considerations of
international comity and expediency." The Court did not, however, discount the
importance of the political question underpinning. See First National City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762-63, 765 (1972).
14. According to the Supreme Court in Banco Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), the act of state doctrine is not required by the constitution but arises "out of the basic relationships between branches of government
in a system of separation of powers."
15. 376 U.S. at 421; L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 267 (8th ed. 1955).
France, Germany, and the Netherlands use a conflict of laws approach in applying the act of state doctrine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 41, at 136 (1965).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
17. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
18. These categories were briefly referred to in an illustrative study distinguishing the act of state doctrine from jurisdictional immunities, see Van Pan-
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tions that involve activity by a foreign government. Application of
the doctrine to a case in the last category emerged in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 9 The Court there found that the
Sherman Antitrust Act did not have extraterritorial reach since
characterizing the lawfulness of an act could not be accomplished
without reference to the law of the country where the act was
completed."0 The Court's alternative rationale in applying the act
of state doctrine, was that a United States court should not determine whether the acts of a private party, aimed at persuading a
foreign state's government to "bring about a result that it declares
by its conduct to be desirable and proper"" are unlawful. Departing from American Banana's limitation on extraterritorial antitrust laws, United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.22 held that an antitrust action alleging a conspiracy to control sisal imports initiated
in the United States, and aided by foreign legislation that was
prompted by the defendants, was not barred by the act of state
doctrine because the acts leading to the conspiracy and its effects
occurred within the United States. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,2 3 the doctrine prevented the assertion of an American
claim against a bank representing Cuba for recovery of the proceeds from property expropriated by the Cuban government. Sabbatino emphasized that American courts were precluded from inquiring into the validity of a foreign state's public acts;2 4 moreover,
it used a flexible approach that balanced the consensus concerning
the particular area of international law in dispute against the
United States foreign policy.25 One year before Sabbatino, the
Court had held in ContinentalOre Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp.2 1 that the act of state doctrine did not bar an antitrust action
based on an alleged conspiracy to control the production of ferrovanadium. In concluding that no foreign act of state was involved,
huys, In the Borderland Between the Act of State Doctrine and Questions of
JurisdictionalImmunities, 13 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1193, 1211-12 (1964).
19. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
20. Id. at 357.
21. Id. at 358.
22.

274 U.S. 268 (1927).

23.

376 U.S. 398 (1964).

24. 376 U.S. at 401. The court replaced the Underhill prohibition against
sitting in judgment of foreign acts with a prohibition against questioning the
validity of the acts. In practice there is little difference between the two concepts
since both decline to inquire into the legality of foreign acts.
25. Id. at 428.
26. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
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the Court preliminarily examined the foreign actor and determined that its acts could be distinguished from those of the foreign
state. 7 Recent cases illustrate a noticeable trend toward similar
examinations before applying the act of state doctrine. In
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 8 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit indicated that summary procedures
should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation, stating
that the act of state doctrine does not offer blanket immunity to
all conduct that involves a foreign government. 2 The court there
declined to apply the doctrine where the defendants had allegedly
combined and conspired to prevent plaintiff from milling and exporting Honduran lumber, aided by the Honduran government's
enforcement of certain security interests. In Bernstein v. N. V.
0 the
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when the executive branch represented to the
court that judicial restraint would not further American foreign
policy interests the court could proceed with the case. The Supreme Court, however, has recently shifted emphasis from the
Bernstein exception to other reasons for limiting use of the act of
state doctrine. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba31 suggested that it
was voluntary submission by a foreign claimant to an American
court's jurisdiction, rather than the Bernstein exception, that permitted assertion of a setoff against a claim asserted by a foreign
state. 2 The Supreme Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba33 did not apply the act of state doctrine where
sums had been mistakenly paid to Cubans operating nationalized
cigar plants since the operators had only commercial as opposed
27. In Continental Ore the plaintiff questioned the allegedly anti-competitive
marketing practices of a company appointed as Canada's exclusive wartime vanadium agent. The Court found that it was permissible to examine the relationship
between the acts of the defendant corporation and the foreign government before
the Court decided whether to apply the act of state doctrine.
28. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
29. 549 F.2d at 605-06. See also Rupali Bank v. Provident National Bank, 403
F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
30. 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
31. 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The case involved a counterclaim by an American
bank against a Cuban bank for expropriation of property. The Court permitted
assertion of the counterclaim since Cuba had originally brought the action as a
claim for excess collateral which it had pledged to secure a loan.
32. 406 U.S. at 772-73.
33. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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to governmental authority. 4 The judicial trend towards limiting
the application of the doctrine has been supported by the legislative branch. Congress attempted to reverse the presumption of
Sabbatino and Bernstein-thatthe act of state doctrine applied to
foreign acts unless the executive branch issued a directive to the
contrary-by passing the Hickenlooper amendment. 5 The amendment prevents United States courts from basing a refusal to adjudicate property claims on the act of state doctrine unless the foreign state has not acted contrary to international law or the executive branch determines that the act of state doctrine is applicable.
This amendment, however, has been interpreted narrowly in practice,3" leaving the scope of the doctrine's application to further
definition by the courts.
III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant court determined that under the Sherman Act there
was subject matter jurisdiction over the third antitrust claim,3 7
then proceeded to adopt the lower court's analytical framework
regarding the act of state doctrine. 8 The instant court first separated the jurisdictional holding of American Banana, that the
Sherman Act does not apply extraterritorially, from the holding
that the act of state doctrine applied where defendants had persuaded a foreign government to bring about a certain result. The
instant court found that although the former was unpersuasive, the
latter was controlling." The court then remarked that Dunhill left
the Sabbatino approach intact 0 and noted that since the sovereign
acts of Libya did not fall within the commercial limitation of
Dunhill, they were within the ambit of the act of state doctrine.,
425 U.S. at 691-94.
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1970).
Williams, supra note 10, at 737.
The instant court carefully stated that "[Tihe Sherman Act is applicable
cause pleaded in the third claim. However, the fact that the court has
jurisdiction does not make the issue justiciable . . . . Were the Sherman Act not
applicable here we would never reach the act of state doctrine . . . ." 550 F.2d
at 74.
38. The court stated that for Hunt to prevail he must establish that "but for
the conspiracy Libya would not have committed" the aggressive acts. To estab34.
35.
36.
37.
to the

lish this would "require judicial inquiry into 'acts and conduct of Libyan officials,
Libyan affairs and Libyan policies.
Government's actions.'" Id. at 72.
39. Id. at 75.
40. Id. at 72-73.
41. Id. at 73.

. .

and the underlying reasons for the Libyan
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Thus the court found the claim to be non-justiciable since the
inquiry into the pleadings would inevitably require judging the
acts of a foreign state.12 In so finding, the instant court rejected
plaintiff's contention that the act of state doctrine should not be
applied because Libya was not named as a defendant or suggested
as a co-conspirator but rather was characterized as a victim of the
conspiracy2 While the court acknowledged that these factors
served to distinguish plaintiff's argument from a similar unsuccessful approach in Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas &
Oil Co., 44 the instant court insisted that plaintiff's mere characterization of Libya's act as lawful did not prevent application of the
act of state doctrine. 5 The court stated that although Libya was
not designated a defendant or co-conspirator, its acts remained
elements in the chain of causation. First, the court determined
that plaintiff's argument that the action by Libya was lawful contradicted the State Department's characterization of the expropriation as retaliatory in motivation and a violation of international
law. 7 The court concluded that additional inquiry into the Libyan
acts or motivation would be embarrassing to the Executive's conduct of foreign affairs.48 According to the instant court, the claim
could not be established unless the court examined the nexus between Libya's motivation for the acts and the acts themselves. "
The court, however, found that Libya's motivation and the legality
of the seizure were logically inseparable, and reasoned that examination of the motivation required assessment of the validity of the
act." Second, the court felt that its inability to undertake any
comprehensive fact finding in the area of foreign relations limited
its inquiry into Libya's acts. The instant court stated that applica42. Id.
43. Id. at 75-76.
44. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In Occidental, plaintiff's private antitrust suit alleged that two Trucial States, Great Britian, and Iran were conspirators. The case was dismissed under the act of state doctrine.
45. 550 F.2d at 76.
46. The court mentioned that the plaintiff did not deny that a private plaintiff
bringing an antitrust action "must allege and establish that his business or property was injured as a direct result of the Sherman Act violation." Id. at 76.
47. A note from the American Embassy in Tripoli in response to the Libyan
nationalization of Hunt's assets labelled the acts a political reprisal directed

against the United States. A.
1973, at 335.

NATIONAL LAW

48.
49.
50.

550 F.2d at 77.
Id.
Id. at 77-78.

RoVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTER-
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tion of the act of state doctrine would have to be re-defined to
permit examination of the motivation of the foreign sovereign,
and declined the task of distinguishing motivation from the act
itself out of fear that the act of state doctrine would be weakened.. 2
Thus, the instant court held that the act of state doctrine precludes judicial inquiry into the motivation for, as well as the validity of, the acts of a foreign state committed within its territory.
Judge Van Graafiland, in dissent, argued that the act of state
doctrine does not prohibit, but rather requires, judicial examination of the nexus between the conduct complained of and the foreign sovereign. 3 He noted three cases in which a court entertained evidence concerning the role played by American citizens
in motivating acts of foreign officials.55 The dissent also disagreed
with the majority's position that plaintiff must establish Libya's
motivation for the act of seizure and thereby call into question the
validity of the Libyan acts. 6 The dissent suggested that Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co.,5" in which the Supreme Court declared that
"state authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in
restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity,"" applied in foreign as well as in domestic "states."5 The dissent then
concluded that the instant court's reliance upon American Banana
was misplaced and that where the validity of a foreign state's acts
are not called into question the foreign state's "participation in the
wrongdoing of individual defendants should not be permitted to
screen the defendants" from liability.60
IV.

COMMENT

The instant decision runs contrary to the current trend toward
limiting application of the act of state doctrine. The court summa51. The instant court notably did not admit that the chain of events prompting Libya's acts could conceivably be differentiated from the motivation.
52.
53.

550 F.2d at 77-78.
Id. at 79.

54. United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Cotton,
471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.
1968).
55. 550 F.2d at 80.
56. The dissent stated that plaintiff's burden of proof required only proof of a
causal relationship between defendant's conduct and the injury. Id. at 80 n.2.
57. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
58. 550 F.2d at 80.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 81 n.2.
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rily rejected the argument that an analysis of the motivations behind an act of a foreign state need not question the validity of the
act itself although this very distinction has been drawn in other act
of state cases. The Ninth Circuit found it possible to investigate
the nature of a foreign nation's interest without challenging the
motivation and by implication the validity of its acts.6 Tim berlane
stated that activities by a private actor would not be protected by
the act of state doctrine even if a foreign government's acts were
procured as part of defendant's overall scheme.2 Significantly,
Timberlane's approach is parallel to the instant dissent in that
under each analysis the act of state doctrine would not preclude
initial inquiry into the nature of the foreign nation's involvement.
The dissent, however, further suggests that even if the foreign
nation sanctions the alleged private anticompetitive acts, the act
of state doctrine should not be invoked automatically. As the dissent reads Cantor, a foreign state's "'authorization, approval, encouragement, or participation in restrictive private conduct confers no antitrust immunity' upon the wrongdoer." 3 Since Cantor
involved only domestic states, the dissent's application of the holding to a situation involving a foreign state is questionable.64 Nevertheless, the rationale does lend further support to the argument in
Timberlane that a foreign government's participation in a series of
acts does not axiomatically necessitate immunity from antitrust
law under the act of state doctrine. Furthermore, United States
courts ought not refuse, as did the instant court, to inquire into an
alleged anticompetitive scheme by private parties simply because
of possible complications'in its investigation of the acts of a foreign
government allegedly involved in the private scheme. Although in
some cases difficulties may arise from the reaction of a foreign
state to the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States, from a
foreign state's refusal to supply pertinent evidence, "5 or from the
inability of American courts to obtain sensitive information, alternative solutions are available. The Court in Zenith Radio Corp. v.

61. 549 F.2d at 607.
62. Id. at 608.
63. 550 F.2d at 80.
64. The dissent at least addresses this important issue, whereas the majority
avoids the question completely by assuming that Libya could not be characterized as a participant in any wrongdoing since it was named as a victim of the
conspiracy in plaintiff's complaint.
65. This possibility is suggested in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 156-57 (1968).
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Hazeltine Research Inc.,66 for example, held that inferences drawn
from circumstantial evidence may establish the causal connection
between the antitrust violation and the injury. 7 Thus, the Second
Circuit's refusal to inquire not only into the motivations behind
the acts of a foreign government but also into its involvement in
the defendant's alleged scheme leads to an entirely different treatment of the act of state doctrine than that in the Ninth Circuit.
Two important considerations result from the instant case's holding. First, inconsistent application of the act of state doctrine by
the circuit courts will not further American foreign policy interests.
Second, contrary to the recent trend to avoid blanket use of the act
of state doctrine, the instant decision extends the application of
the act of state doctrine from a proscription against questioning
the validity of foreign acts to a proscription against examining
even those factors which prompt foreign acts.
Ronald P. Cima
66.

395 U.S. 100 (1969).

67. The dissent also cited Zenith for the proposition that an antitrust plaintiff
need only show that the illegality complained of was a material cause of the
injury. 550 F.2d at 80 n.2. See 395 U.S. at 114 n.9.

PREEMPTION-STATE STATUTE PROHIBITING NONRESIDENTS OR
ALIENS FROM FISHING IN ITS WATERS IS PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

A foreign owried commercial fishing corporation and its subsidiaries,'licensees under the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act,'
brought suit in United States district court 3 to enjoin the Virginia
Commissioner of Marine Resources from enforcing state statutes
prohibiting ships owned by foreign nationals from fishing anywhere in the Commonwealth and barring nonresidents 5 from fish1. Seacoast Products, Inc., the principal plaintiff (appellee) is a Delaware
corporation, qualified to do business in Virginia. The two subsidiaries are The
New Smith Meal Co., Inc. and Sound Oceanic Corp. In 1973 the business was
sold to Hanson Trust Ltd., a United Kingdom company owned almost entirely
by alien stockholders. Seacoast continued its operations unchanged after the sale.
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 251-336 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Section 251 provides:
Vessels of twenty tons and upward, enrolled in pursuance. . . of this title,
and having a license in force, or vessels of less than twenty tons, which,
although not enrolled, have a license in force. . . . and no others, shall be
deemed vessels of the United States entitled to the privileges of vessels
employed in the coasting trade or fisheries.
Section 262 states that "[n]o licensed vessel shall be employed in any trade
whereby the revenue laws of the states shall be defrauded." Section 263 provides
that "[t]he form of a license for carrying on the coasting trade or fisheries shall
be as follows: 'License for carrying on the (here insert "coasting trade," "whale
fishery," "mackerel fishery," or "cod fishery," as the case may be.)' "The above
three categories of fisheries were the only ones prevalent at the time. These
categories have remained unchanged in the statute. Thus, appellees' license for
the "mackerel fishery" entitled them to fish for menhaden as well. Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 n.8 (1977). At the time of its sale,
Seacoast's vessels were enrolled and licensed United States flagships. Under 46
U.S.C. §§ 808, 835, the transfer of these vessels to a foreign-controlled corporation
required approval of the Department of Commerce. Following this approval the
vessels were reenrolled and relicensed pursuant to 46 U.S.C. §§ 251, 252, 263.
3. Seacoast Products, Inc. v. Douglas, 432 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Va. 1975).
4. VA. CODE § 28.1-81.1(b) provides in part:
Within the meaning of this section, no corporation shall be deemed a citizen
of the United States unless seventy-five percentum of the interest therein
shall be owned by citizens of the United States. . . and the corporation is
organized under the laws of the United States or of a state, territory, district, or possession thereof.
5. VA. CODE § 28.1-60 states in part:
License for taking menhaden fish-A nonresident .
firm or corporation
may take or catch fish known as "menhaden" within the three-mile limit
on the seacoast of Virginia and east of a straight line drawn from Cape
Charles lighthouse to Cape Henry lighthouse. . . .provided such person,
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ing for menhaden6 in Chesapeake Bay. The plaintiffs argued that
the Virginia statutes violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment and specifically that § 28.1-81.1 of the Virginia Code was preempted by the Bartlett Act.7 Virginia claimed
that the statutes were essential to protect its fishing waters from
foreign encroachment.' The district court found § 28.1-60 unconstitutional under the equal protection clause9 and held that § 28.181.1 was preempted by the Bartlett Act.10 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction," and on appeal held,
affirmed. State statutes subjecting federally-licensed fishing vessels owned by aliens or nonresidents to restrictions not applicable
to residents are preempted by the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act and are, therefore, invalid. Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 1740 (1977).
H.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Authority for the doctrine of preemption originates in the article
firm or corporation has applied for and obtained a license to take and catch
such fish within the above-defined area ....
The area thus defined excludes Chesapeake Bay. Section 28.1-60 enables nonresidents who meet the citizenship requirements of § 28.1-81.1 to fish for menhaden
in the three-mile wide belt off the coastline, but not within the Chesapeake under
any circumstances. In the past, Seacoast had had processing plants in Virginia
and was entitled to fish in the Chesapeake as a resident, and more recently, as a
nonresident in the area defined by § 28.1-60. Seacoast became an alien corporation in 1973, and with the passage of § 28.1-81.1 in 1975, it was unable to meet
the citizenship requirement, and was therefore excluded completely from Virginia's menhaden fishery. 97 S. Ct. at 1744.
6. Seacoast is one of three companies that dominate the menhaden industry,
the largest fishing industry in the United States.
7. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). On appeal appellees also
argued that the statutes violated the commerce clause, due process clause, and
the foreign affairs power. 97 S.Ct. at 1745 n.5.
8. 432 F. Supp. at 4.
9. Id.
10. The Act provides in relevant part that "[i]t is unlawful for any vessel,
except a vessel of the United States . . . to engage in the fisheries within the
territorial waters of the United States .
" The Supreme Court did not consider preemption under the Bartlett Act.
11. 425 U.S. 949 (1976). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding
that the doctrine of abstention should not apply in this case. The doctrine of
abstention requires forebearance of federal judicial action where the underlying
state statute is susceptible to an interpretation which would avoid constitutional
adjudication. Since plaintiffs' claims are based on the supremacy clause and
federal preemption, abstention was found to be inappropriate. 97 S. Ct. at 1744
n.4.
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VI supremacy clause. 2 The circumstances under which a state
statute will be preempted by the enactment of federal law has
received considerable attention from the Supreme Court.' 3
Preemption cases may be divided into three main groups: (1)
where Congress has expressly preempted state legislation; (2)
where Congress has impliedly preempted state regulation; (3)
where Congress has neither expressly nor impliedly prohibited
state legislation, but where the state law is nevertheless in conflict
with federal regulation of the area. In cases where Congress has
expressly precluded states from legislating in a field, the state law
is automatically invalidated under the supremacy clause.'4 The
validity of state legislation is more difficult to determine, however,
in cases where federal legislation does not expressly prohibit state
regulation, but where the nature of the subject matter being regulated' 5 or the breadth and complexity of the federal legislative
scheme"6 manifests an implied congressional purpose to occupy the
field. In the leading case of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,'7 the
Court stated that such an implied purpose is evidenced where the
scheme of federal regulation is so "pervasive" or the field is one in
which a federal interest is so "predominant" that state laws are
presumed to be excluded."8 Rice creates a presumption in favor of
the validity of state law, however, when Congress has legislated in
a field traditionally occupied by the states, unless preemption of
state police power is "theclear and manifest purpose of Con12. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
13. See, e.g., Note, The PreemptionDoctrine:Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. Rnv. 623 (1975).
14. E.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1311 (1977) (the Wholesome Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695, which on its face prohibited "'marking,
labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than,
those made under' the Act," held to preempt a California statute with "different
requirements").
15. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44
(1963); Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
16. City of Burbank v. Lockheed, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (In light of the pervasive
nature of the scheme of federal regulation of aircraft noise, reaffirmed by the
Noise Control Act of 1972, the Federal Aviation Administration, now in conjunction with the Environmental Protection Agency, has full control over aircraft
noise, preempting state and local control).
17. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
18. Id. at 230.

640

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL 10.637

gress."' 9 This point is further supported by FloridaLime & Avocado Growers v. Paul," in which the Supreme Court upheld a
California statute prohibiting transportation or sale in California
of avocados even though Congress had acted in the field. The Court
stated that preemption would not occur "in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the subject matter permits
no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained." 2 ' Generally, complete proscription of the state from legislating on an aspect of commerce is rare, leaving the states with
some freedom to act.2" Once validity of state regulation in an area
has been established, either because Congress has expressly provided for it or the area has been traditionally occupied by the
states, the question remains whether the state law is so inconsistent" or in such conflict with federal law,24 that the offensive state
law must be invalidated. The Court has fashioned myriad tests for
determining if such conflicts or inconsistencies exist. In Hines v.
Davidowitz,'5 a case involving conflict between the Federal Alien
Registration Act and a more stringent Pennsylvania alien registration law, the Court questioned whether a state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
of Congress."" A more restrictive viewpoint developed in earlier
decisions and given renewed vitality in FloridaAvocado Growers,
is that preemption should occur only where there is actual conflict
between federal and state regulations. 27 The most recent synthesis
of preemption doctrine guidelines appears in Jones v. Rath Pack19.

Id.

20. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
21.. Id. at 142.
22. G. GUNTHER, CONSTrrUONAL LAw 357 (9th ed. 1975), citing H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERn CouRTs AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 435 (1953).

23. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 141; Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
24. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73 (1941); Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S.
1 (1937) (holding that enforcement of a state law requiring safety inspections of
tugs was not barred by enactment of the Federal Motor Boat Act of 1910).
25. 312 U.S. 52 (1940).
26. Id. at 67.
27. "[Wlhether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the state
regulation must give way, is whether both regulations may be enforced without

impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed
at similar or different objectives." 373 U.S. at 142. "[Tihe exercise by the State
of its police power, which would be valid if not superseded by federal action, is
superseded only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that

the two acts cannot fairly be reconciled or consistently stand together." Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. at 10.
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ing Co.,2" a successful suit to enjoin enforcement of a California
statute and regulation pertaining to labeling of packaged foods by
weight, wherein the Supreme Court endorsed the application of the
"clear and manifest purpose" standard of Rice, as well as the
"unmistakably so ordained" criterion established in FloridaAvocado Growers and the conflict test of Hines." On the other hand,
state law has been upheld where there was only minimal conflict
between federal and state law, and where the state was acting in
an area traditionally occupied by the states, as long as its laws are
used to effectuate a "legitimate local public interest. 30 The regulation of fisheries has traditionally been left to the states.31 Evenhanded, legitimate conservation measures, even- those impinging
upon the rights of federally-licensed fishermen, have consistently
been upheld by the Court. 2 In Smith v. Maryland,33 a Maryland
statute limiting the use of certain implements in oyster fishing was
held valid because "the purpose of the law [was] to protect
growth of oysters in the waters of the state."u The states' interest
in protecting fish and wildlife has traditionally been accorded substantial weight by the courts.Y Although some early courts equated
this interest with a right of "ownership," 36 the more modem view
28. 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977).
29. Id. at 1309.
30. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), (where the
purpose of a city smoke abatement ordinance was to promote the health and
welfare of the city's inhabitants, enforcement against federally licensed and inspected vessels was a valid exercise of the state police power).
31. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 203 (1961); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313
U.S. 69, 74-75 (1941); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 266 (1891);
McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394-95 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S.
71 (1855).
32. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (prohibiting use of diving equipment in
taking sponges); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (preventing use of
drag nets in fishing for menhaden); Smith v. Maryland (prohibiting use of certain
implements in oyster fishing). But see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397 (1948)
(South Carolina law that charged residents $25 for a shrimp fishing license, but
nonresidents $2500, was struck down as obviously discriminatory and without a
bona fide conservation purpose).
33. 59 U.S. 71 (1855).
34. Id. at 73.
35. "The State holds the propriety of this soil for the conservation of the
public rights of fishery thereon ....

[I]t may forbid all such acts as would

render the public right less valuable, or destroy it altogether." Id. at 75. See also
cases cited in supra note 32.
36. State power over fisheries "is, in fact, a property right, and not a mere
privilege or immunity of citizenship." McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. at 395. "The
common ownership imports the right to keep the property, if the sovereign so
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of the

importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of a vital resource.

'3

However, Congress

has also passed fishing laws, including the federal licensing statute. The scope of the federal licensing statute was first set forth in
Gibbons v. Ogden,3" where a New York law granting a steamboat
monopoly was struck down because it conflicted with the federal
act. Justice Marshall concluded that the purpose of the licensing
act was to grant "an authority to carry on the coasting trade" and
not merely to confer a badge of nationality on the vessel. 9 Subsequent decisions emphasized that the conferral of a federal coasting
license does not exempt a vessel from all state regulation in the
area.4" Similarly, the Enrollment and Licensing Act has not completely preempted state regulation of fisheries, but rather has left
to the states the power to regulate certain aspects of that industry.
Thus, the question that arises in cases where a state has enacted
laws regulating its fisheries is whether under the Hines or Florida
Avocado Growers standards the statute fatally conflicts with concurrent federal legislation.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant opinion, the Court first declined to decide the case
on the same constitutional grounds as did the district court. Relychooses, always within its jurisdiction for every purpose." Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896). In the instant case the state argues that both the case
law and the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970), recognize an
ownership interest of a state in the fish swimming in its territorial waters. The
Act gives the states "title," "ownership," and "the right and power to manage,
administer, lease, develop and use" the lands beneath the oceans and natural
resources within their jurisdiction. The Court emphasized, however, that within
this grant of power there are retained "all constitutional powers of regulation and
control" over these lands and waters "for purposes of commerce, navigation,
national defense, and international affairs." 97 S. Ct. at 1751, quoting 43 U.S.C.
§ 1314(a) (1970).
37. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. at 402; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434
(1920).
38. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
39. Id. at 212-13.
40. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. at 446; Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 599 (1881).
41. The appellees had argued that the statutes violated the equal protection
clause and the commerce clause and that they interfered with conduct of foreign
affairs. See note 7 supra. Cases involving protective fishing laws have frequently

been prosecuted on the former two grounds, as well as under the due process
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ing instead largely upon its synthesis of preemption doctrine in
Jones v. Rath Packing, with particular emphasis on the Rice test,
the Court determined that the instant case dealt with "federal
legislation arguably superseding state law in a field 'traditionally
occupied by the states,' "42 and, therefore, that preemption would
be found only if exclusion of state regulation were "the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress." 43 Accordingly, the Court began its
analysis by inquiring into the congressional intent and purpose in
enacting the enrollment and licensing laws. Noting the lack of
legislative history, the Court relied almost exclusively upon the
interpretation given the federal statute in Gibbons v. Ogden. The
Court cited with approval the portion of Chief Justice Marshall's
opinion which held that conferral of a federal license gives a vessel
"authority to carry on the coasting trade," and is not intended
merely to establish the nationality of the vessel. Conceding that
Marshall's interpretation of the Act's intent had been criticized by
some commentators, the Court nevertheless bolstered its reliance
on Gibbons with the assertion that continued reenactment of the
Act in approximately the same form conclusively indicated Congress' endorsement of that interpretation." The Court recognized
also the "negative implications" of Gibbons, that the states retain
power to enact "reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and
environmental protection measures."45 The Court then equated the
"coasting license" conferred in Gibbons with the "mackerel fishing
license" granted appellees in the instant case, and reasoned that
just as the "coasting license" confers the authority to carry on the
coasting trade, so the "fishing license" confers the right to "fish in
Virginia waters on the same terms as Virginia residents."4 Admitting that Congress had not traditionally had the power to regulate
fisheries in state waters, the Court concluded that under modern
commerce clause doctrine such power exists where, as in the instant case, there is some effect on interstate commerce. Having
decided that the Act validly confers a federally-licensed right to
clause and the privileges and immunities clause. See, e.g., Alaska v. Arctic Maid,
366 U.S. 199 (commerce clause); Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm'r, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (equal protection and due process); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)
(privileges and immunities clause).
42. 97 S. Ct. at 1745.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1749. See generally Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,

414 (1975).
45. 97 S. Ct. at 1749-50.
46. Id. at 1751.
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fish, the Court concluded that the Virginia statutes were invalid
since they conflicted with appellee's exercise of that right.47 Moreover, the Court rejected appellants' arguments that an
"ownership" interest in the fish carried with it the right to exclude
some federally-licensed fishermen. 8 Finally, the Court listed policy considerations in support of its decision-value of federalism
and the threat of Balkanization of the fishing industry that might
result from a proliferation of discriminatory state fishing laws.49 In
upholding the district court's decision, the Court held that evenhanded and reasonable state regulation in this area would have
been valid, but that § 28.1-60 and § 28.1-81.1 were preempted by
the Federal Enrollment and Licensing Act insofar as they subjected federally-licensed vesssels owned by aliens and nonresidents
to restrictions not applicable to similarly licensed American citizens and Virginia residents.
IV.

COMMENT

The instant opinion is important in determining the extent to
which the preemption doctrine may be used in the future to strike
down discriminatory state fishing laws. In deciding the case on
preemption grounds, rather than on equal protection, due process,
or commerce clause rationale, the Court has indicated that
preemption is the most effective means of invalidating protective
fishing laws.5" Since the courts have considerable leeway in finding
an implied congressional exclusion or determining that the state
laws are in sufficient conflict with federal regulation, preemption
is a more flexible basis for deciding a case. This enables the courts
to consider protective fishing statutes individually, striking down
those whose impact is discriminatory, while upholding even47.

Id. at 1752, citing Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 142 ("no

State may completely exclude federally licensed commerce").
48. See note 37 supra.
49. New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, and Delaware, for example,
have similar protective fishing laws.
50. One author suggests that in the closely related field of endangered species
protection, preemption is a more effective basis for invalidating state legislation
than are either due process or commerce clause rationales. Increased concern for
environmental problems has made due process invalidation less likely, while the
use of commerce clause reasoning has been weakened by decisions holding state

conservation laws valid where there is only an incidental effect on interstate
commerce. Note, FederalPreemption:A New Method for InvalidatingState Laws
to Protect Endangered Species, 47 COLO. L. Rv. 261, 263 (1973).
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handed and reasonable conservation measures.' Unfortunately,
the instant decision appears to expand the courts' discretion even
beyond this point. In applying the test recently set forth in Jones,
the Court erroneously places primary reliance on the incorporated
standard of Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator. Moreover, the Court unnecessarily appends policy considerations not wholly applicable to the
case before it.52 The Rice standard, where "the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject," should be applied
to strike down state laws where, regardless of any conflict between
state and federal regulation, the "clear and manifest purpose" of
Congress is to supersede state regulation. The field itself will have
been preempted. This is not the situation in the instant case, as is
clear from the Court's qualifying statement that reasonable and
evenhanded conservation measures are unaffected by its decision. 4
Control of fisheries has uniformly been held to be a local matter,
amenable to local regulation. The Court in the instant case alters
the standard that should be applied to the area of state fishing and
conservation law, allowing future courts to expand the scope of
preemption simply by finding that the federal interest in this area
is so dominant as to preclude state regulation. The Court's policy
statement similarly distorts the intended scope of the instant holding. By expounding federalism and warning of the dangers, of
"Balkanization" of the commercial fishing industry, the Court
encourages the erroneous assumption that the case is one in which
the interest in the area of regulation is so inherently national that
only federal regulation should be allowed. It is clear, however, that
the Court felt the Virginia statutes were offensive only to the extent that they were discriminatory, not because they were enacted
in a field preempted by federal scheme. This case is better characterized as one where, as in Huron PortlandCement Co. v. Detroit
or Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court found that the state could act
as long as it did so impartially and in pursuit of a legitimate local
51. The Court is able to avoid or postpone constitutional decisions by relying
instead upon statutory construction, thus assuring the continued sanctity of the
Constitution while at the same time providing Congress with an opportunity to
reconsider and revise its enactments. See Note, Preemption as a Preferential
Ground, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 224-25 (1959).
52. 97 S. Ct. at 1752.
53. 331 U.S. at 230.
54. 97 S. Ct. at 1753.
55. See note 31 supra.
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public interest. If subsequent decisions attach more weight to the
standards applied in reaching the instant decision and the Court's
inaccurate policy statements than to the actual holding, then the
concededly significant state interest in protecting its fisheries may
be greatly jeopardized.
Douglas Berry

WARSAW CONVENTION-PROVIsION FOR LIMITING LIAB-LITYRECOVERIES IN PERSONAL INJuRY ACTIONS AGAINST AIR CARRIER
EMPLOYEES, As WELL As AGAINST THE AIR CARRIER ITSELF, ARE TO
BE LIMITED BY THE WARSAW CONVENTION

I.

FACTS AND HOLDING

Personal representatives, heirs, and next of kin of nine airline
passengers killed on a Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight from Tel
Aviv to New York,I in an attempt to circumvent the liability limitation provisions of the Warsaw Convention, 2 brought suit not
1. On September 8, 1974, Trans World Airlines flight 841 from Tel Aviv to
New York crashed into the high seas some 50 nautical miles west of Cephalonia,
Greece, killing all 79 passengers and 9 crew members on board.
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 875, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adherence of United States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934)
[hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The relevant provisions of the Convention relating to liability limitations are as follows (with official French version
reproduced where relevant to the text):
Article 17
French (Official):
Le transporteurest responsable due dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre lesion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit a bord de l'aeronef ou au
cours de toutds operations d'embarquement et de debarquement.
[emphasis added.]
English (Unofficial):
The carriershall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or
disembarking.
[emphasis added.]
Article 22
English (Unofficial):
In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs [In 1934, about $8,300]
. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may
...
agree to a higher limit of liability.
Article 24
French (Official):
(1) Dans les cas pr6vus aux articles 18 et 19 toute action en
responsabilite, a quelque titre que ce soit, ne peut etr6 exercde que dans les
conditions et limites pr~vues par la present6 Convention.
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against the carrier (TWA) itself but against the President of the
carrier and its Vice-President for Audit and Security. Plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants negligently failed to prevent the placing of a bomb, which is alleged to have exploded and caused the
disaster, on board the aircraft. Defendants denied the allegations
and, in the alternative, pleaded the liability limits of the Convention as modified by the Montreal Agreement.3 Defendants argued
that under the Convention a carrier4 can be held liable for the
death or injury of passengers, but that its liability is limited in
amount to $75,000 per passenger unless plaintiff(s) can show willful misconduct.' The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York concluded that the Convention's liability
limitations should not be extended to carrier employees,' dismissed defendants' defense, and certified the question to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.7 The Court of Appeals, held,
reversed and remanded. Under the limits prescribed by the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs may not recover from an air carrier's
employees, or from the carrier and its employees together, a sum
greater than that recoverable in a suit against the carrier itself.
Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), petition for cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3293 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1977) (No. 77-339).
I.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Warsaw Convention was created to promote uniform rules
(2) Dans les cas pr~vus a l'article 17, s'appliquent egalement les
dispositions de l'alinea precedent.
[emphasis added.]
English (Unofficial):
(1) In the cases covered by articles 18 and 19 any action for damages,
however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits

set out in this Convention.
(2) In the cases covered by article 17 the provisions of the preceding
paragraph shall also apply.
[emphasis added.]

3. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention
and the Hague Protocol, Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, Civil Aeronautics Board Order
Approving Agreement, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966). The Montreal

Agreement provided for absolute carrier liability up to $75,000 on all flights into
or out of the United States.
4. The term "carrier" is not defined in the original Convention.
5. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, article 25, 49 Stat. 3000 at 3006,
3020.
6.
7.

Reed v. Wiser, 414 F. Supp. 863, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
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relating to the international transportation of persons, baggage, or
goods performed by aircraft for hire.8 The United States became a
party to the Convention on June 27, 1934.1 The Convention establishes the liability of carriers for damage to passengers,'" sets a
maximum liability per passenger at $8,291.87," and prescribes certain defenses available to the carrier. Since the Convention's enactment, the limitation of liability provisions have been the center
of considerable debate. 2 Citing the low liability limitation, the
United States gave a formal six month notice of denunciation of
the Convention on November 15, 1965.' As a result, a conference
was convened in Montreal and an interim arrangement known as
the Montreal Agreement was formulated.'4 Under the Agreement,
the majority of international air carriers 5 scheduling flights involving the United States'6 agreed to increase their liability limit to
$75,000 per passenger, inclusive of legal fees,'" and to waive any
8. Landry, Swift, Sure and Equitable Recovery-A Developing Concept in
InternationalAir Law, 47 N.Y. ST. B.J. 372, 373 (1975).
9. See, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of
the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 6, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. This was the equivalent in 1934 of 125,000 Poincare francs, the amount
specified in the Warsaw Convention. The standard of fineness was fixed in gold.
12. For detailed discussion of the history of the Convention, amendments
thereto, and debate surrounding the limitation provision, see H. DasON, THE
LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW (1954); L. KREINDLER, 1
AvIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 11.01-11.09 (rev. ed. 1974); 1 C. SHAWCROSS & K. BEAuMONT, AIR LAW (3d ed. 1966); Calkins, The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw
Convention, 26 J. Am L. & CoM. 217 (1959); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The
United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HAv. L. REv. 497 (1967); Sands,
Air Carrier'sLimitations of Liability & Air PassengersAccident Compensation
Under the Warsaw Convention, 28 J. AIR L. & CoM. 260 (1961-62); The Warsaw
Convention-Recent Developments in the Withdrawal of the U.S. Denunciation,
32 J. AIR L. & CoM. 243 (1966).
13. The notice was in the form of a diplomatic note delivered by the American
Embassy in Warsaw to the Government of the People's Polish Republic. 50 DEP'T
STATE BuLL.923 (1965). See also, Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supranote 12, at 551.
14. Agreement C.A.B. 18,900, Civil Aeronautics Board Order Approving
Agreement, May 13, 1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
15. For a listing of air carriers that had signed the Agreement as of April 1970,
see L. KREiNDLER, supra note 12, § 12A.03.
16. In promulgating the Montreal Agreement, a quasi-legal and largely experimental system of liability of a contractual nature was imposed upon international aviation. Broadly stated, the system provides for absolute liability and a
limitation of damages. See id. § 12A.01.
17. Liability limits had previously been increased by the Hague Protocol in
September, 1955. The Protocol incorporated amendments to the Convention (in-
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defense under subdivision (1) of article 20'1 of the Convention.'9
There is some question whether the liability of agents of the carrier
is limited" since the Convention speaks only of the carrier itself.2 '
To the extent that such ambiguities exist, they must be resolved
by the interpretation of the agreement." Where the official text of
a treaty is in only one language, that language is controlling.rI
While the Agreement was officially translated into several languages, the Convention's only official language is French. 4 In
Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 5 the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restricting and the other enlarging, the more liberal interpretation
is to be preferred." The Court noted that construing a treaty in this
manner tends to give effect to the purpose which animates it.2 In
Block v. Compagnie NationaleAir France,2 the Fifth Circuit applied similar reasoning in finding the Warsaw Convention applicable to charter flights.H In Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc.,3" the
cluding article 25A) which increased the maximum limit of passenger liability to
$16,584 and specifically extended to agents of the carrier the liability limitation
available to the carrier itself. See L. KREINDLER, supra note 12, § 12.02[1]. The
United States neither ratified nor adhered to the Hague Protocol. See id. § 12.01.
The text of the Protocol may be found at 2 Av. L. REv. (CCH) 27.
18. Article 20(1) provides:
English (Unofficial):
The carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken
all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for
him or them to take such measures.
19. Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
20. L. KRIiNDLFn, supra note 12, § 11.0516].
21. See Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, articles 17 & 22.
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES

§ 146 (1965).

23. Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 454 (1930), cited in Rosman v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d at 852.
24. Article 36 provides:
English (Unofficial):
This Convention is drawn up in French in a single copy which shall remain
deposited in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland and
of which one duly certified copy shall be sent by the Polish Government to
the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
25. 311 U.S. 150 (1940).
26. 311 U.S. at 163, citing Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-4 (1933)
and Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928).
27. 311 U.S. at 163.
28. 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967).
29. Id. at 330.
30. 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640 (1964).
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New York Court of Appeals concluded that the proper procedure
is to examine the treaty as a whole and to study problems which
it was intended to solve.31 In its interpretation of the Convention,
the court stated that "he who considers merely the letter of an
instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and all statutes
are to be construed according to their meaning, not according to
the letter."3" While the majority of victims of international air
disasters have limited themselves to seeking redress from the airline company owning or operating the airplane involved, or from
the manufacturer of the airplane, a pilot may ordinarily be held
liable for damages caused by his operation of the airplane. 33 Such
liability arises either under the common law doctrine of res ipsa
loquituru or the civil law doctrine that the person controlling the
vehicle is absolutely liable for injuries resulting from an accident,
regardless of the absence of fault or negligence." United States
trial court decisions on the issue have been few in number and
inconsistent in result. In Wanderer v. Sabena, the Supreme Court
of New York County held, without explanation and without express reference to an agency relationship, that agents of the carrier
were protected by the limits of the Convention.3 In Chutter v.
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,37 plaintiff brought suit against the
carrier and its agent,3 alleging that the negligence of both contributed to her injuries. The court held that the conditions and limitations of the Convention inured to the benefit of the defendant
agent since the defendant airline was fulfilling a part of its obliga31. 203 N.E.2d at 642. See also, Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54
(1963); Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936).
32. 203 N.E.2d at 643, quotingRiver Brand Rice Mills v. Latrobe Brewing Co.,
305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953). See also, United States v. A.L. Burbank &
Co., 525 F.2d 9, 12-14 (2d Cir. 1975); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Aerolineas
Peruanasa, S.A.,307 F.2d 802, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1962).
33. 555 F.2d at 1082.
34. See, Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932); Seaman v.
Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N.Y.S. 251 (1930); A. LoWENFELD, AvATION LAW § 4.32 (1972), cited in 555 F.2d at 1082 n.3.
35. Judgment of April 7, 1956, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1956] J.C.P. H 9453;
Judgment of Oct. 11, 1954, Cour d'appel, Bordeaux, [1955] D. Jur. 32; Judgment
of Nov. 12, 1952, Cour d'appel, Paris, [1953] J.C.P. II 7650; C. Civ. art. 1384,
para. 1 (Fr.); all cited in 555 F.2d at 1082 n.4.
36. 1949 U.S. Aviation Rep. 25; see also H. DRION, supra note 12, at 157.
37. 132 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
38. Allied Aviation Service International Corporation, which pursuant to a
cargo and line agreement with defendant KLM placed and removed the passenger
loading stairs used for entry and exit from the aircraft.
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tion under the contract of transportation through its agent. 39 In
Pierre v. EasternAirlines, the court held that the liability of the
pilot of an Eastern Airlines airplane was not limited by the Convention." Because the Warsaw Convention restricts the force of
statutory and common law rights to recover death and personal
injury damages, the question of whether its provisions should be
strictly or broadly construed is of considerable importance.

III.

THE INSTANT OPINION

In the instant case, the court of appeals held that at no time has
the United States abandoned the principle that air carriers should
be protected from having to pay out more than a fixed and definite
sum for passenger injuries sustained in international air disasters

except in the event of proof of "willful misconduct."4 1 Addressing
the merits of the case, the court found that articles 17, 22, and 2442
presented two questions of interpretation: first, whether in the
absence of any definition of the term transporteur (carrier) used
in the Convention, that term is limited to the corporate entity or
is intended to embrace persons actually performing the corporate
entity's function;4 3 and second, whether the use of the word cas in
article 24(1) and (2) should be translated as "cases,' 4 as appellees
contended, or "events." 5 Citing Block v. CompagnieNationaleAir
39. 132 F. Supp. at 615.
40. 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957). The court's rationale is worth noting:
The Warsaw Convention at the time of the accident (1953) applied to the
carrier only. Various efforts had been made to amend the terms of the
Convention to include the servants and agents of the carrier . . ., but to
no avail. Not until 1955 was the limitation so extended in article 25A of the
Convention.
152 F. Supp. at 489. This reasoning implies that had suit been brought against
the pilot after the incorporation of article 25A of the Hague Protocol, the pilot
could have invoked the limitation provision. But since the United States neither
ratified nor adhered to the Protocol, this reasoning is questionable.
41. 555 F.2d 1079, 1087 n.11. The court noted that with the possible exception
of Pierre v. Eastern Airlines, 152 F. Supp. 486, there has never been a Warsaw
case in any country in which a plaintiff has obtained, by suing the carrier's
employees instead of the carrier itself, more than the sum for which the carrier
itself would be liable under the Convention.
42. See note 2 supra.
43. 555 F.2d at 1083.
44. The amended phrase would read, "In the cases covered by article 17
45. In article 17 (unofficial English version) cas is so translated. Appellees
argued that transporteur,as used in article 17, should be restricted to the corporate entity only, and that cas, as used in article 24(1)-(2), should be translated
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France,46 the court found that while under common law the liability of the wrongdoing agent is a separate and clear source of redress, distinct from and logically prior to that of the principal, the
Convention was intended to act as an international uniform law
that must be read in the context of the national legal systems of
all its members.47 Drawing on the remarks of delegates to conventions on international air law subsequent to the enactment of the
Warsaw Convention, the court ruled that a purely common law
reading of the language of the Convention would be inappropriate." In holding that the language of the official French version
of article 24 implied that the conditions and limits set out in the
Convention applied to the instant case, the court interpreted cas
to mean "event" or "case" in a nonjuridical sense. The court further noted that the authors of the Convention intended article 24
to bar circumvention of the article 22 liability limitations.49 Turning to the question of the overall purposes of the Convention, the
court adopted the positions of the Supreme Court in Bacardi Corp.
v. Domenech ° and the New York Court of Appeals in Eck v.
United Arab Airlines, Inc.51 Holding that the Convention should be
construed to effectuate its evident purposes, the court isolated two
principles underlying the Convention's enactment. First, the purpose of the liability limitation "was to fix at a definite level the
cost to airlines of damages sustained by their passengers and of
insurance to cover such damages.""2 Second, it was the desire of
the signatories to the Convention to establish a uniform body of
rules on liability governing international aviation. Citing the history of the Convention, the court held that to permit a suit against
as "cases." Such a translation would'render the Convention inapplicable to the
instant case under article 24(2) since the corporate entity was not a party defendant here.
46. 386 F.2d 323.
47. 555 F.2d at 1083.
48. Id. at 1084.
49. Id. The court relied on Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., Ltd., 388 F.
Supp. 1238, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) and H. DRION, supra note 12, at 158. The

district court had accorded considerable weight to the United States' refusal to
ratify the Hague Protocol of 1955. The court of appeals considered this reliance

to be misplaced, noting that the only reason for the refusal was the United States'
dissatisfaction with the low level of the carrier's liability limitations, not with the

other
50.
51.
52.
53.

provisions of the Protocol.
311 U.S. 150. See text at note 25 supra.
15 N.Y.2d 53. See text at note 30 supra.
555 F.2d at 1089.
Id. at 1090.
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a carrier's employees for an unlimited amount of damages for personal injuries would undermine the purpose behind article 22.11
Further, the court distinguished the decision in Robert C. Herd &
Co. v. Krawill Machinery Corp.,5 holding that § 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods By Sea Act (COGSA),50 which limits the liability
of an ocean carrier, does not limit the liability of an independent
stevedoring company. Unlike the Convention, not only does
COGSA specifically exclude the stevedoring company from its definition of "carrier," 5 but COGSA also must be read against the
common law. 8 The court held that a construction of the language
of articles 22(1) and 24 which extends the Convention's liability
limitation to passenger claims against employees not only reflects
the plain meaning and purpose of the French text of these articles,
but accomplishes all of the Convention's objectives. 9
IV.

COMMENT

The instant case is one of first impression at the federal appellate level on the question of whether an airline employee sued for
damages for personal injuries suffered in an international airplane
accident may invoke the Warsaw Convention's liability limitations. In applying liberal principles to obtain an arguably conservative result, the Second Circuit has judicially extended the limits
of the Warsaw Convention. It appears that the court's reasoning
was predicated on the assumption that unless the limitation provisions protect employees of the carrier as well, their purpose would
be defeated. If employees are unprotected, most carriers would be
forced to include indemnification provisions in contracts of employment. Further, the carrier would be burdened with unlimited
claims, and, as a result, would have to insure against such risk.
Consequently, litigation would increase, costs of operation and insurance rates would rise, and the added expense would be passed
on to the passenger."0 Arguably, this process would culminate in an
54. Id. at 1089.
55. 359 U.S. 297 (1959).
56. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1970).

57. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (1970).
58. 555 F.2d at 1093.
59. Id. at 1093. Earlier in the opinion, the court had noted that affirmance of
the district court's decision would force future tribunals to assume the task of
determining what domestic law applies and whether under that law recovery
might be had for an amount greater than that recoverable against the airline. Id.
at 1089.
60. See, Comment, CarriageBy Air Act, 1952-Limitation of Air Carrier's
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effect contrary to that anticipated by Secretary of State Cordell
Hull6"' and other proponents of limitation of liability in favor of the
carrier. 2 The court apparently overlooked the fact that current
employment contracts negotiated with air carriers commonly contain indemnification provisions and, correspondingly, the carrier is
usually compelled to insure itself against the added risks undertaken as a consequence of such provisions. While attempts have
been made to find a strictly legal basis for the proposition espoused
by the court in the instant decision,"' most authorities contend that
such a basis does not exist. 4 The foundation for the argument
rejected by the court rests on the fact that no attempt was made
at Warsaw to cover the liability of employees for their individual
tortious acts.15 Nothing in the history or preamble of the Convention indicates otherwise. Furthermore, articles 17, 18, 19, and 22
speak only of the carrier, whereas in articles 20 and 25, the carrier's
agents are mentioned. While it is arguable whether the weight of
judicial authority conclusively supports one side or the other, there
is a persuasive argument for a result contrary to that reached in
the instant case. In this regard, American jurisprudence recognizes
two noteworthy principles: first, a culpable tortfeasor should be
required to fully compensate his innocent victim for actual damages sustained, and second, anyone who does not cause damage to
another should be exculpated from liability. 7 If liability limitations in general are not to be viewed as alien to these principles,
they must at least reflect the full capacity of the airline industry
to secure insurance coverage for the risks of commercial flight. 8 As
for those who would argue for uniformity of rules, H. Drion, one of
the foremost proponents of the limitations, has conceded that
"[i]f there is any field in which unification of the law on a worldwide basis would be inappropriate, it is the field of the amount of
Liability-Whether Servants of CarrierAlso Protected, 41 CAN. B. REv. 124
(1963).
61. Id. at 126.
62. For an extensive discussion of the rationales of limitations of liability, see
H. DRION, supra note 12, at 12-44 nn.14-42.
63. Comment, supra note 60, at 126.
64. Id. at 128.
65. Id. See also note 12.
66. See Comment, supra note 60, at 128.
67. See Sincoff, Absolute Liability and IncreasedDamages in International
Aviation Accidents, 52 A.B.A.J. 1122, 1125 (1966).
68. Cabranes, Limitations of Liability in InternationalAir Law, 15 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 660, 683 (1966).
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of

liability set by international agreement, embodied in treaty form
and adjustable only by subsequent international agreement, are
simply incapable of being kept up-to-date. 0 In view of the scarcity
of prior United States trial court rulings on the issue and the vigor
with which the Second Circuit attacked the questions involved,
this decision will likely have significant ramifications for aviation
accident law.
Jon L. Goodman
69.

70.

H. DRIoN, supra note 12, at 42.
Cabranes, supra note 68, at 683.

